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Financial distress, lender passivity and project finance : the case of Eurotunnel
I. Introduction
On 14 September 1995, Eurotunnel announced it was suspending payment on its roughly £8.56 billion in junior bank debt. This default gave rise to one of the largest financial restructuring ever seen, implying renegotiation with a syndicate of more than 220 banks. Two years and a half later, in early 1998, Eurotunnel was successfully restructured. Since then, the stock price stays at a very low level (the price was divided by 10 since 1987) and financial difficulties have not been overcomed even if formal bankruptcy has not yet been declared in England or France.
1 Eurotunnel's 1995 Eurotunnel's -1998 financial restructuring was the last step of a turbulent history since the signature of the Franco-British Treaty in 1987 launching the Channel Tunnel's project. The setting up of the project began with the November 1987 IPO that raised £770 million and with a syndicated loan of £5 billion. At that time, the total financing needs up to June 1993 (the anticipated date for the opening of the Tunnel) were estimated to £4,874 million. These financing needs grew exponentially during the construction period as delays and unexpected costs multiplied. By May 1994, they stand up to £ 10,116 million. Eurotunnel was forced to raise new cash from shareholders (two capital increases in 1990 and 1994) and from banks to cover these inflated costs. Just before the commercial opening of the tunnel in November 1994, the company presented a typical project capital structure with a leverage ratio (total debt on total assets) of 80%. A few months later, it became apparent that the firm would be unable to continue to service all of its interest payment obligations and accordingly on September 14, 1995, Eurotunnel suspended the payment of interest on existing junior debt (which represented 96% of total debt).
This suspension of interest payments had the effect under the credit agreement of triggering a standstill, initially running to March 14, 1997, and which has been extended to December 14, 1997. The purpose of the standstill was to provide a period during which lenders would not take enforcement action against Eurotunnel. During the standstill, the Steering Group (a creditors committee appointed by the members of the bank syndicate) was formed and negotiated with
Eurotunnel to formulate proposals regarding the restructuring of the indebtedness of Eurotunnel.
On October 2, 1996, Eurotunnel announced that it had reached agreement with the Steering
Group on the outline of the Financial Restructuring, under which Eurotunnel would reorganise its debt and capital structure. The plan was approved by shareholders in July 1997 and took place in April 1998. It consisted in a complex mixture of debt for equity swaps, debt consolidation at under-market rate and convertible bonds.
Eurotunnel's distress is remarkable on several features. First, the 1995-1998 financial restructuring is one of the largest private workout ever seen in Continental Europe. The only comparable case is the workout of the Italian company Ferruzzi Group in early 90s described by Penati and Zingales (1998) . 2 Second, Eurotunnel is a well-known case of project financing. Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) precise that Eurotunnel has the distinction of being both the largest and second largest project financing in the history.
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These two features give a unique opportunity to study questions still standing in the literatures concerning financial restructurings and project finance: − How can we explain the difficulties encountered by this large project finance? The question is all the more interesting since little is known about the performance of large project financed companies. The prediction is unclear: whereas empirical evidence suggests that large projects often fail (Flyvberg et al. 2002) , the literature generally considers that project loans lead to a better performance than asset-based loans (Esty 2003 (Esty , 2004 . According to the agenda drawn by Esty (2004) , this clinical study of Eurotunnel is a unique occasion to determine if the failure is due to the large size of the project "or if the means of financing (corporate, project or public finance) plays a role" (Esty 1994 p.221) . − How did Eurotunnel finalize a financial restructuring involving so many creditors? In others words, we have to understand how Eurotunnel managed to solve the well-known coordination problem arising in a multiple creditors' context (Gertner and Scharfstein 1991) . − Why Eurotunnel has not yet overcomed its financial difficulties and why banks seem reluctant to trigger bankruptcy despite recurrent distress? At first glance, Eurotunnel's workout illustrates the results of Gilson (1997) who finds that out of court restructurings often lead to chronic financial distress due to modest concessions from lenders. 4 Eurotunnel is however specific as the firm has been distressed for nearly 15 years. The reluctance of banks to trigger bankruptcy over such a long period is still an open question.
The paper shows that Eurotunnel's difficulties were primarily due to the wrong contractual structure set up at the origin of the project. The main contracts were signed at a time where
Eurotunnel had virtually no existence. Moreover, Eurotunnel lacked powerful sponsors to defend its interests against opportunistic contractors (especially, the construction companies). As a consequence, these co-contractors imposed long-term contractual features extremely unfavourable to Eurotunnel. These conflicts were not anticipated at the very beginning of the project since the construction companies initially held a part of Eurotunnel's shares. However, they quickly sold their participation, increasing the conflicts of interests with their weak client's management and new shareholders (essentially individuals). The analysis also shows that the other important contractor, the bank syndicate, was unable to stem the opportunistic behaviour of the construction companies due to its lack of expertise on technical features. The banks, trapped by huge costs overruns, behaved in turn opportunistically and transferred risks to individual shareholders. On a more general standpoint, the dispersion of equity ownership resulting from the successive public right issues exacerbated agency conflicts between the firm and its suppliers and favored the expropriation of individual shareholders by the construction companies and the banks.
At the end of the construction phase, the indebtness was so high that banks exercised the actual power. Nevertheless, the success of the 1995-1998 financial restructuring was long to take shape as negotiations between the banks and Eurotunnel lasted more than two and a half years. Two reasons explain the difficulties encountered during this negotiation. The first one comes from the aggressive attitude of individual shareholders who tried to influence the terms of the financial restructuring. The shareholders seized this opportunity to denounce against the opportunistic behaviour of the banks during the preceding years. Following this objective, they benefited from the support of Eurotunnel's management. Despite their lack of power on a legal standpoint, some associations exerted lobbying on political authorities (especially in France) to obtain greater concessions from banks or to ask for a state intervention. The second reason comes from the high number of banks participating to the international loan syndicate. As the rule of unanimity applied, the loan syndicate had to be reorganized. Some initial lenders, opposed to the restructuring plan, sold their participation to new investors (mainly vulture investors) through
Eurotunnel's debt unofficial secondary market. This reorganization led to a concentration of lenders as the number of participant banks decreased from 220 to 174 during the financial restructuring period.
That leads to the third and principal finding of our paper. We show that despite the statements of Eurotunnel's management, the banks made no actual concessions in the 1995-1998 financial restructuring. The term "concession" is in fact ambiguous: does it refer to a comparison between the face value of debt and the value of the new package (debt for equity swaps, convertible bonds,…) or to a comparison between the market value of the debt before restructuring and the value of the new package? Adopting the second view, it appears that junior debt was already greatly depreciated before restructuring (junior debt traded at 43% of its face value). Based on banks' projections at the time of restructuring, we estimate the value of the new package at 43-55% of junior debt's face value. If we take a broader view, by considering the rights issue of May 1994 preceding the interruption of payments in September 1995, we can even conclude to important wealth transfers between shareholders and banks. After the completion of the financial restructuring, Eurotunnel's indebtness was too high to enable the recovery of the firm. By this way, the banks tried to maintain a high bargaining power in subsequent restructurings in order to extract all future operational revenues generated by the project. This behaviour corresponds to the "controlled liquidation" described theoretically by Vilanova (2004) . The banks preferred to favor the continuation of activity even if financial distress was chronic. This strategy may be considered as optimal considering the high costs of liquidation due to legal complexity (the liquidation would have to respect French and English bankruptcy law), political pressures, reputational concerns and high specificity of the assets. We also show that the banks were reluctant to trigger formal bankruptcy because of the debtor-friendly French bankruptcy law. In this respect, Eurotunnel appears as a typical example of lender passivity.
Globally, the Eurotunnel case provides some explanation to large projects' failure. Whereas the advantage of PF (project finance) is theoretically due to a simplified organizational and governance structure, large project companies cannot deal with a simplified structure as regard to the high number and the diversity of stakeholders. In particular, the importance of financial needs and the resulting dispersion of equity and debt ownership exacerbate agency conflicts in large project companies. In the same reasoning, the case illustrates some potential counterproductive aspects of limiting managerial discretion through the use of highly indebted capital structures and tight debt covenants. The reduction of managerial discretion may lead to an increased fragility of firms towards co-contractors. Even if banks act as "shadow directors" and assume power, they may lack expertise and incentives to limit the expropriation of shareholders. When financial distress appears, the banks have few incentives to make concessions and may try to transfer risks to less sophisticated individual shareholders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief description of empirical and theoretical findings about the performance of large project companies and the difficulties of large private workouts. Section 3 provides a brief history of Eurotunnel before the suspension of payments in 1995. Section 4 analyzes Eurotunnel's decline until 1995 and shows the devastating effect of the contractual structure adopted at the origin of the project. Section 5 describes the 1995-1998 financial restructuring. Section 6 provides evidence that the banks made no concessions during 1998 private workout and used financial distress strategically. Section 7 concludes.
Performance of large project companies and impediments to large private workouts
According to Esty (2004, p.213) , project finance "involves the creation of a legally independent project company financed with equity from one or more sponsoring firms and non-recourse debt for the purpose of investing in a capital asset". The typical project is also characterized by high leverage (with a debt-to-capitalisation ratio between 70% and 80%), a highly concentrated equity ownership and concentrated debt ownership (Esty and Megginson 2003) . As research on this topic is still in its infancy, the main problem is to identify the motivations underlying the use of PF and to evaluate the relative performance of this type of financing.
To reach this objective, several studies adopt a descriptive approach. They show that PF is most commonly used for capital-intensive projects in tangible-asset-rich industries, located in riskier than average countries. PF loans have also a longer maturity and less restrictive covenants than more traditional syndicated lending (Kleimeier and Megginson 2000) . At first glance, PF loans seem to be riskier than asset-based loans. Despite this higher risk, Kleimeier and Megginson find that PF loans have lower spreads than non-PF loans. They interpret this result in the following way: "…the project financing structure reduces important agency costs that are inherent in the creditor/borrower relationship" (p.87). This agency-cost motivation of PF is well-spread in the literature. It is based on the assumption that the highly concentrated equity ownership and the high level of debt reduce managerial discretion on free cash flows. The reasoning follows the line of Jensen's (1986) well-known free cash-flow theory. Consequently, the efficiency of PF is not surprising as observed capital and governance structures in project companies look like the ones present in leveraged-buyouts (Esty 2002) . One may be surprised by the unanimity of opinions, whereas little evidence is known on the actual performance of PF companies. 5 The positive impact of PF organizational structure on agency conflicts, if theoretically attractive, has still to be proved empirically. This is particularly the case concerning the performance of large projects as the few empirical studies dedicated to this topic show that these projects perform very badly and experience systematic costs overruns (Flyvberg et al. 2002). 6 Whereas large projects often fail, little evidence is known on the resolution of financial distress in large project companies. Esty and Megginson (2003) There is conflicting evidence on the behaviour of banks faced to distressed firms. On the one hand, Gilson et al. (1990) find that bank borrowing increases the likelihood of successful debt restructuring outside of bankruptcy. On the other hand, Asquith et al. (1994) and James (1995) show that banks make few concessions for firms with public debt outstanding. For example, Asquith et al. (1994) find only one case (over seventy-six) where the bank agrees to take equity and reduce principal. Analyzing the outcomes of out-of-court debt restructurings, Gilson (1997) also finds that debt reductions are smaller when firms owe more debt to institutional lenders.
Collectively, these results show that the banks' reaction depends on potential wealth transfers towards public debtholders. While interesting, this line of reasoning does not apply to Eurotunnel as this firm had no public debtholders at the time of financial restructuring.
Other factors may explain the difficulties of the 1998 financial restructuring. First, we have to consider the difficulties engendered by the presence of numerous banks in the loan syndicate. In such a context, coordination problems between lenders may arise and may result on the firm's liquidation. Many theoretical papers including Bulow and Shoven (1978) or Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) More paradoxically, the impediment to a leverage-reducing restructuring may come from existing shareholders. Shah (1994) and Lie et al. (2001) find a negative stock price reaction at the announcement of leverage-reducing exchange offers. This result is surprising because the majority of their sample firms experienced some form of distress at the time. Intuitively, one may consider in this context that a reduction of leverage reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy and preserves value for shareholders. For Lie et al. (2001) , this potential beneficial effect for shareholders is counterbalanced by the fact that the announcement also conveys information that the firm's financial condition is more fragile than expected. Though convincing, this explanation is not unique. In a context where the consent of shareholders is needed to validate the restructuring plan, shareholders may try to obtain increased concessions from lenders through priority violations (Wruck 1990 ). This phenomenon is not specific to formal bankruptcy nor to
Chapter 11. As we will see later, the consent from shareholders was needed to implement Eurotunnel's restructuring plan, due to the proposed debt for equity swaps.
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If the complexity of the contractual structure is typical of project financing (see Esty 2003) 7 ,
Eurotunnel presents specific features. The most proeminent one is certainly the leading role of banks and constructors. The initial shareholding of the company was shared between 10 construction companies and 5 banks which collectively provided £47 million. The owners (sponsors in the project finance literature) had tight control on the construction and the financing contracts. For example, the same 10 construction companies formed TML (Trans Manche Link) which was awarded the construction contract. In the same way, the 5 banks were also leading banks in the debt part of Eurotunnel's funding. As stated by Michael Grant, at the time Eurotunnel's Corporate Finance Manager, "…the 10 construction companies and 5 banks negotiated among themselves the Construction Contract and the detailed term sheet for the credit facilities" (Grant 1997 p.48) . This strong bargaining power of banks and construction companies influenced the shape of major contracts. As we document in section 4, Eurotunnel's difficulties
were not purely exogeneous and were greatly due to the contractual structure adopted in the first years of the project. To introduce this idea, we present briefly now Eurotunnel's main contracts:
the construction, railways usage and financing contracts.
For many analysts, the construction contract is at the origin of Eurotunnel's subsequent difficulties. As stated in the November 1987 Offer for Sale "The (construction) contract provides financial incentives for the Contractor (TML) to complete the tunnels under budget and financial penalties if they are completed over budget or late". Despite these statements, the construction phase (which actually started in February 1988) was characterised by delays and cost overruns.
At the time of the 1987 IPO, the construction and equipment costs of the Channel were estimated to £4.2 billion and the completion of the construction phase was planned in summer 1991. In 1990, the anticipated costs were inflated to £5.7 billion. Finally, the construction of the tunnel cost more than £7 billion and was one year late. Originally planned to open in May 1993, the tunnel opened in mid-1994. Table 1 shows the evolution of projected construction costs over time at the different steps of the 7 years construction phase and illustrates cost overruns on the different pieces of works to be completed before the commercial opening of the Tunnel. This cost escalation was at the origin of a major conflict between Eurotunnel and the construction companies (The TML consortium). This conflict appeared from the very beginning of the construction schedule (Le Monde, October 4, 1988) as the construction companies were faced with technical problems caused by poorer than expected ground conditions under the English coast. These first difficulties led to tunnelling delays and cost overruns. In the following years, the main conflict concerned the cost of the rolling stock. The TML consortium argued that the Intergovernmental Commission (IGC) imposed major safety changes that led to considerably more sophisticated shuttles than expected. Jack Lemley (former Chief Executive of TML) asserted in this spirit that IGC had "free rein to change physical criteria without providing the money to do so" (Lemley 1995) . TML run many disputes against Eurotunnel in order to obtain compensation for cost overruns (see Appendix B).
This serie of disputes was partly due to the incentives / penalties scheme of the construction contract. In reality, the construction contract signed in 1987 charged almost all the construction risk to Eurotunnel. For tunnelling costs (representing roughly 50% of overall costs), TML was only responsible for 30% of cost overruns with TML's contribution being capped at a maximum of 6% of the target cost. Eurotunnel would pay 100% of any cost overruns over this cap. Even when the contract seemed to be favorable to Eurotunnel (TML was assumed to support 100% of cost overruns on the terminals and the fixed equipment in the tunnel), some covenants gave TML the possibility to transfer cost overruns to Eurotunnel. Indeed, the construction contract explicitly made provisions allowing TML to ask for price adjustments in case of unpredictable ground When Eurotunnel won the offer launched by the UK and French Governments in early 1986, the projected financial structure was quite simple. The sponsors (5 banks and 10 construction companies) were supposed to invest roughly £50 million and a bank syndicate was supposed to bring the most part of the additional funds. This schedule was initially respected as shown in Table 2 . At the time of the October 1987 credit agreement, Eurotunnel's financing needs until the completion of the construction were supposed to be covered as the total funds obtained by Eurotunnel (£5,253 million including equity issues and debt) exceed the projected £4 billion construction costs.
However, faced to the escalation of costs, Eurotunnel's capital structure has changed continuously during the construction phase. At the time preceding the suspension of payments (September 14, 1995), Eurotunnel's total indebtness was approximately £8 billion (book value) whereas the amount of capital obtained through successive equity issues was roughly £2.5 billion. The debt to capitalization ratio of the project was then 77%, slightly higher than the 70% average quoted by Esty (2004) for project companies. Nevertheless, thanks to the success of the equity offers, this ratio was lower than the one anticipated in 1987 ( Table 2 shows that the ratio dropped from 83% in 1987 to 77% after June 1994).
If Eurotunnel's debt to capitalization ratio matches the one of a typical project company, a striking difference stems from the high dispersion of ownership and debt in Eurotunnel's project.
The junior debt issue of October 1987 involved 220 banks whereas the 1994 senior debt was provided by 67 banks. Table 3 below shows that the ownership was also far more dispersed than in classical project companies. If the initial shareholding was concentrated in the hands of the sponsors (the construction companies and the banks held respectively 66.55% and 30.68% of ownership), these one gave up control almost immediately with the private issue of October 1986. This private issue (Equity 2) permitted the entry of institutional investors and an independent majority on the Eurotunnel's board. The dilution of construction companies'
shareholding was spectacular in the first years: their share of the equity decreased from 66.55% of Eurotunnel's capital in mid-1986 to 7% after the 1987 rights issue. In late 1996, a few months before the resolution of the crisis initiated by the 1995 suspension of payments, the initial sponsors (the banks and the construction companies) had only residual claims on capital.
Exploiting data presented in Table 3 , we estimate that banks' shareholding was in the 7%-13% range and that the percentage held by the construction companies was in the range 0%-8%. 8 The dispersion of ownership was important as nearly two thirds of the units (64.3%) were held by 700,000 individuals (mostly French) following the successive right issues since the 1987 IPO. One may ask if Eurotunnel has to be viewed as a failure or a success. On this specific point, it is interesting to note that engineers consider the project as a great success despite financial distress. See for example Vandebrouck (1995) , a former director of TML, whose paper is intitled "The Channel Tunnel: The Dream Becomes Reality". 10 The fact that Eurotunnel was an "empty shell " at the time of the bid is indirectly attested by the evolution of the number of employees over time: 25 in December 1986, 143 in November 1987 (Eurotunnel 1987, Financial restructuring proposals, p.131). time, the absence of long-term sponsors appears as a major impediment to the success of Eurotunnel. As stated by Kirkland (1995) , Eurotunnel's Technical Director from 1985 through 1991, "they (the banks and construction companies) had no interest in creating a 'Client' before they knew that their bid was successful…In any event, post-bid, it was in their interest to have a weak client" (p.5). Indeed, the banks and the construction companies were co-contractors of Eurotunnel for the two main contracts: the financing and the construction contracts respectively.
As a consequence, Eurotunnel was engaged with extremely unfavourable long-term contracts that did not consider the question of the viability and profitability of the firm. The interests of investors and more precisely of the future public shareholders were not considered at that time.
As noticed by Grant (1997) , a former Eurotunnel's Corporate Finance manager, "The banks argued that they had to represent Eurotunnel in dealing with the construction companies…there was no strong representative of the future shareholders to negotiate the two key contracts at arm's length with the contractors and the banks" (p.48). So this is not surprising to notice that nearly all the contracts were challenged after 1987 by Eurotunnel's management (see Appendix B), at a time where individual shareholders held the majority of ownership and where banks began to realize that their claims were more risky than anticipated.
Although many reasons may explain the wrong contractual structure set up in the first months of the project, a key factor is certainly the inability of banks to manage Eurotunnel. Many arguments confirm the predominance of banks from the birth of the project: the banks were promoters of the project; contrary to the construction companies, they kept their shares after the 1986 private placement. Moreover, even if the banks held only a small part of shares after the successive public rights issues (in 1987, 1990 and 1994) , they were still dominant at the Board of Directors (see Table 4 below). For some observers, the dominance of banks was a major impediment to Eurotunnel success during the construction phase. 13 Faced to TML, the banks were unable to elaborate their own cost projections. This information asymmetry had disastrous effects. The banks thought at that time that TML's estimates were high in order to increase the expected revenues of construction companies. In reality, TML communicated artificially low costs in order to be sure to win the tender offer. 14 The shape of the construction contract was greatly influenced by this seminal mistake. As the banks and Eurotunnel's management expected an underrunning of cost, they focused on incentives features and neglected penalties for delays and cost overruns. Once the banks and the management understood their mistake, disputes multiplied with TML. A settlement was signed in 1990, aimed at increasing the TML's contribution to tunnelling cost overruns. But the disputes resumed a few months later and lasted until 1997.
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In order to understand the escalation of costs, it may be useful to precise the three types of costs that were included in the Construction contract: target costs for tunnelling, lump sum costs for terminals and electromechanical work and procurement costs for rolling stock.
The shape of the construction contract was greatly influenced by the preoccupation of banks to reduce uncertainty. Faced to the technological uncertainty inherent to this project, the banks insisted on the fact that the least defined portions of the work (terminals, mechanical and electrical equipment) be done on a lump sum basis. The banks also insisted to contract with TML for the provision of rolling stock, despite the reluctance of TML which had few expertise in this kind of work. The banks' view was then to implement fixed prices with a unique contractor (TML) in order to reduce risk and to concentrate responsibility (Genus 1997 p.182) . Clearly, these terms of the contract decreased the efficiency of the project: the lump sum costs registered the highest increase after the completion of the contract and the concentration on a unique contractor reduced the competition for the rolling stock work. support, but it (the large size of the syndicate) has nonetheless made the task of managing the Credit Agreement much more difficult" (p.49). At the end of 1987, the total funding of the project was found and no other financing operation was planned for the future. At that time,
Eurotunnel was not expected to use all its credit facilities as the construction costs were estimated to £4.8 billion and that the total funds obtained amounted to roughly £ 6 billion (Eurotunnel 1987 offer for sale).
The reluctance of banks to increase their funding appeared clearly in 1990 when Eurotunnel asked new funds to the original syndicate. As one third of the members banks refused to underwrite, the lead banks were obliged to increase their share of the funding. Political pressure was also used to convince reluctant banks. For instance, the British Government took contact with the Japanese one in order to persuade Japanese financial institutions to participate.
The same reluctance appeared in 1994 when Eurotunnel asked for additional funding at the end of the construction phase. The banks set conditions to increase their funding: they asked for an equity issue assuming 50% of the financing requirements and for an increased priority for the new debt issue. In the same way, the 1994 senior debt agreement was characterized by high margins (up to 250 basis points) despite increased security. The banks did not significantly tighten covenants as Eurotunnel's financial condition deteriorated (the operating cash flow covenant did not change and the global debt service was slightly tighten in the 1990 amendment). Although general covenants were dropped in 1994, these covenants were specific to the construction phase and had no reason to be maintained after June 1994, a time were the construction was virtually completed.
The banks' behaviour depicted here differs strongly from the one described by DeAngelo et al. (2002) . If in both cases, the borrowing firm was submitted to tight covenants that were regularly renegotiated, Eurotunnel's lenders did not manage to lower their risk exposure. Eurotunnel's banks were unable to exploit early covenant violations to limit their losses at a low level. The bank syndicate's only compensation came from the high fees and margins charged to Eurotunnel.
The table 5 data collectively imply that the participant banks had no real alternative but to finance the project despite its increased risk. The project's value if liquidated was virtually nothing before the completion of the tunnel as illustrated by the increased margin during the construction phase compared to the one applied after the completion. Consequently, the banks were constrained to keep financing the project despite the escalation of costs in the hope of a future commercial success of the tunnel. further funding -in the sure knowledge that bankers' minds would be concentrated by the appreciation that an uncompleted tunnel project has little value beyond that of rearing mushrooms" (p.8). Third, additional funds brought by the bank syndicate were since the beginning conditioned to the success of equity issues. The 1994 debt/equity ratio (4.4) was even smaller than the initial one (5 in 1987). As emphasized by Stonham (1995) , the lending banks were satisfied to transfer part of their risk to shareholders as equity offerings allowed Eurotunnel to obtain additional funds while decreasing leverage. Whatever the reasons underlying the increased implication of banks, it is clear that individual shareholders constantly supported Eurotunnel despite its deteriorated financial condition. What was the source of this support? If an event of default occurs and is not waived, opening of a 18 month standstill period to negotiate a rescheduling. During this period, banks are not allowed to accelerate payments and to enforce their security. At the end of the standstill period, if no restructuring plan is approved by lenders, the banks can: -ask for early repayment (bankruptcy) -exercise their substitution right (lenders assume management and take over the concession until the banks obtain full repayment)
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The question is obviously to understand the decline of projected revenues during the construction phase (from 1987 to 1994) but also to understand why reality was even darker. In some ways, Eurotunnel validates the view of Esty (2004) for whom PF individual structural components fit together in a very coherent and symbiotic way. But if the interconnection between individual contracts is strong, it may however lead to an increased weakness of the project. The first years of the project were characterised by opportunistic behaviour from contractors. First, the building companies that were at the origin of the project and that imposed a construction contract where Eurotunnel had to carry all the risks associated to the project. Second, the banks that became dominant due to the increase of indebtness and that transfer an important part of the risk to small uninformed shareholders. In this context, how did Eurotunnel manage to stem its increasing financial difficulties?
19 Many financial analysts expressed their confusion about Eurotunnel's projections in the financial press at the time of the equity issue. Some of them underscored the uncertainty about a potential price war with the ferries. Others were more pessimistic. An analyst even declared : "Eurotunnel's projections are over-optimistic. A new equity issue will be necessary in two or three years" (Les Echos, May 27, 1994).
The 1995-1998 financial restructuring
Even The two and a half year negotiation opposed two groups of stakeholders: the first one was formed by the managers and the shareholders, the second one by the banks.
According to Patrick Ponsolle and Alastair Morton, co-chairmen of Eurotunnel, the decision to suspend payments was motivated by the Board's statement that foreseeable levels of revenue would not permit Eurotunnel to cover its interest charges (Eurotunnel 1997, Financial restructuring proposals p.2). Another declared objective of the managers was to protect the interests of the 750,000 Eurotunnel's shareholders. However, their message was ambiguous: 20 The standstill period was maintained in the 1990 and 1994 amendments as quoted in Table 5 above.
whereas they tried to reassure shareholders by underlining the first commercial success of the Tunnel, 21 they denounced at the same time the intolerable high level of interests. The managers argued for a decrease of interests and a rescheduling of payments. On the opposite, they clearly expressed their opposition to a debt for equity swap (Les Echos, September 15 1995). October 1996 Eurotunnel announces an agreement with the Steering Group on the terms of a financial restructuring. Some details of the plan are released.
Mars 1997
The lenders extend the standstill to December 1997.
May 1997
Eurotunnel releases a document (the "Prospectus") detailing the terms of the financial restructuring proposal.
July 1997 Shareholders approve the terms of the proposed financial restructuring.
November 1997 Eurotunnel announces that the restructuring plan has received the approval of banks and senior lenders.
January 1998
Banks and Senior Lenders formally sign the plan.
The defence of the shareholders' interest was also used as an argument to call for a state intervention. In January 1996, Patrick Ponsolle declared: "State intervention can take place if and only if everyone is convinced that individual shareholders have not been treated fairly" (Les January 11, 1996) . As the negotiations with the banks were difficult, the management 14, 1995) and to the public rights issues of 1987 (350 pences), 1990 (285 pences) and 1994 (265 pences). The divergence on this point was huge between Christian Cambier, the President of an association of individual shareholders, and the banks: whereas the former asked for a conversion price of 300 pences, the latter wanted an issue price close to the present share price. Faced to the management and the individual shareholders, the banks did not express an unanimous opinion. Some of them, especially the agent banks (Crédit Lyonnais, Banque Nationale de Paris, NatWest, Midland) wished to favour the continuation of activity. The argument was straightforward: in September 1995, the exploitation of the Tunnel was too recent to have a clear opinion of Eurotunnel's ability to succeed commercially. In this spirit, this group of banks thought it was too early to trigger bankruptcy and argued for a continuation of activity for almost one or two years. However, some banks argued for a tougher way for different reasons. First, some of them that earned huge profits in 1995 wanted to make provisions immediately. Second, some banks (especially the Japanese ones that owned 20% of capital at that time) faced legal problems due to the anticipated debt for equity swap solution. Last, many foreign banks were indifferent to political pressures from English and French Governments, that desired to avoid bankruptcy. 22 The divergence of opinions between banks was all the more important since the restructuring plan required unanimous consent of all the participant banks (220 banks).
One of the main question asked at the time lies in the uncertainties associated with the refusal of any restructuring plan by the shareholders or the banks. The standstill would then come automatically to an end and according to the concession signed in 1987 the banks would be allowed to enforce their right of substitution. As clearly specified in Eurotunnel (1997, Financial Restructuring proposals, p.4): "Substitution is a process whereby the Lenders may…have the Concession, its rights and obligations transferred to companies owned by them until such time as the Group's obligations to the Lenders have been satisfied, whereupon the Concession may revert to the Group". Beyond legal innovation, the right of substitution asked the question of the ability and the will of the banks to manage daily Eurotunnel. At the time following the suspension of payments, many observers were doubtful about the likelihood of a substitution. 23 The management of Eurotunnel was not in question and many bankers thought that they couldn't do any better themselves. The political and legal consequences of such an action were also uncertain. The well-spread opinion was that the banks only used this threat in order to impose a debt for equity swap to reluctant shareholders. The bankruptcy was also a possible solution but it was generally considered as complex due to the dual legal environment.
When Eurotunnel announced an agreement with the Steering Group on the terms of a financial restructuring in October 1996, the conflicts between the shareholders and the banks were far from being solved. An uncertainty was still existing as the plan had to be approved unanimously by the banks belonging to the loan syndicate and by a majority of shareholders. The management, formerly opposed to a debt for equity swap, was now an ardent defender of this solution considered as inevitable. Patrick Ponsolle expressed clearly this change of mind:
22 The French and UK Governments made their contribution to Eurotunnel's financial restructuring by extending the concession in July 1997. The concession was extended to 99 years (instead of 52 years). 23 The financial press expressed this type of doubt as soon as October 1996. The following citation is representative of this opinion: "The banks will probably agree, eventually, to some form of refinancing because, if Eurotunnel goes bust, they would either have to find a firm to run it for them, or would need to persuade a buyer to bail them out. The first would be difficult, the second almost impossible." (The Economist, January 20, 1996) . "One can dream by refusing to consider the balance of power between the shareholders and the banks. There is no legal system where shareholder rights dominate creditor rights when a firm is in financial distress...In my opinion, the proposed plan has reached the maximum concessions the banks are willing to make. It's an illusion to imagine that the banks would be prone to negotiate a new restructuring plan if a minority of shareholders rejects the plan.
The banks are based in many countries: a lot of them find that their concessions are already excessive in the sight of their rights; most of them do not care about the political consequences of a liquidation. There is a high probability that they find more straightforward to enforce their right of substitution" (Les Echos, June 24, 1997).
One key argument of the banks was also to underline their huge concessions in the restructuring plan. According to its new ally, that is the management, the banks would make a sacrifice of more than £2 billion if the plan was implemented.
Following the agreement with the Steering group, Eurotunnel envisaged to call for a general meeting for shareholder approval in April 1997. However, the restructuring process was hindered as a fire occurred in the Tunnel on November 18, 1996. Eurotunnel decided to postpone the meeting until the implications of the fire on Eurotunnel's business were more fully understood.
Despite the coalition formed by the Banks and Eurotunnel's management, shareholder approval was far from being obvious. Some existing shareholders contested the fact that the banks would obtain the majority of capital following the restructuring. Surprisingly, some associations of individual shareholders expressed a preference for a formal bankruptcy. Simultaneously, they claimed for a nationalisation of the Tunnel. They also called for the entry of a new powerful shareholder, the French national railways company SNCF. Both solutions were clearly in contradiction with the Article 1 of the Treaty that specifies the strictly private financing of the project. The individual shareholders' strategy was clearly to call for a political intervention. In this view, the call to reject the plan was used as a strategic tool in order to put pressure on the French Government, considering the 720,000 French individual shareholders. Finally, convinced that the banks would not accept further concessions, a large majority of shareholders approved with the financial restructuring proposals in July 1997. The bank syndicate approved the plan in January 1998.
The restructuring plan, as presented to the shareholders in April 1997, was established on the basis of the junior debt outstanding at October 15 1996, the date corresponding to the agreement between Eurotunnel and the Steering Group. The junior debt to restructure was in the range £7872 to £8597 billion depending on the exchange rates considered. 24 Obviously, these amounts were just illustrative as the exchange rates were susceptible to change until the signature and the effective implementation of the plan.
The restructuring plan was incredibly complex as anticipated by many observers. It consisted in the distribution of five instruments (common equity, convertible equity notes, participating loans, resettable facility, new Junior Debt) in exchange of existing Junior Debt. Table 6 summarizes the main terms of the restructuring instruments. 24 Eurotunnel's junior debt was constituted of several tranches. The amount of junior debt outstanding at October 15, 1996, split by currency was the following (we use m for million): £4126m, FRF28992m, $349m, BEF21341m, ECU252m. As the main part of the debt was in £ and FRF, the translated sterling amount depends mainly on the FRF/£ exchange rate. £7872m corresponds to a 10.00 FRF/£ exchange rate and £8597m to a 8.00 FRF/£ exchange rate.
The proposal also planned to distribute free warrants to existing shareholders. If exercised, these warrants would serve to repay in cash a part of the convertible equity notes and would give existing shareholders the opportunity to retain a majority of Eurotunnel's equity. However, the likelihood of exercise was low as the price was planned to be around £1. 24 Technically, the complexity of the restructuring scheme made very difficult for shareholders to evaluate the distributional consequences of the plan. In this section, we will try to evaluate these consequences on an ex ante basis, in other words with the information available in April 1997.
The most visible consequence of the restructuring was the dilution of existing shareholders' claim following the implementation of the plan. This dilution had two origins. First, the debt for equity swap which gave the banks an immediate 46.66% share ownership. Second, a differed dilution due to the repayment in equity of the convertible equity notes. An uncertainty was still standing in April 1997 about the number of new shares necessary to repay the equity notes at maturity (December 31, 2003) . The restructuring plan creates 645,161,300 equity notes attributed to junior lenders (v) At maturity, these equity notes are either converted on a one-to-one basis or repaid in cash (at £1.48 per equity note). (vi) The restructuring plan stipulates that the proceeds of any exercise of 2001 warrants can be used to repay in cash equity notes up to a maximum of 86.5 m equity notes. The same principle applies for 2003 warrants with a maximum fixed to 253.5m equity notes. We consider a 9.00 FRF/£ exchange rate.
Notice however that the case n°1 supposed implicitly a sharp 77% rise of Eurotunnel's stock price before the maturity of warrants (respectively 2001 and 2003) as the exercise price was fixed at £1.24 and the stock quoted around 70 p in April 1997. Moreover, the exercise price was up to 15.38 % over the issue price of equity used in the debt for equity swap. In brief, only a strong recovery of Eurotunnel in the following years would permit the existing (mostly individual) shareholders to retain the majority of ownership.
The welfare consequences of the restructuring plan for the banks were far more difficult to evaluate. Beyond the banks and Eurotunnel's management statements, the actual banks' sacrifice may only be appreciated thanks to a precise valuation of the instruments distributed through the restructuring plan. We established valuations of this package with the information available at the time of the restructuring and through different scenarios. The As documented in Table 8 , the banks made only concessions in comparison with the face value of the old junior debt. As regard to the last traded prices before the restructuring (the market value of the old junior debt), no concessions were made. 25 In this view, The second important question about the restructuring plan deals with Eurotunnel's ability to face interest charges in the future. In other words, was the decrease of interest charges sufficient to avoid chronic financial distress? The following figure suggests that the interest charges planned in the restructuring plan (and consequently the global terms of the restructuring) were set in order to align interest charges with the predicted EBITDA almost in the short term. During this stabilization period 28 , nearly all the expected cash flow was dedicated to the payment of interests to the loan syndicate. The identity of the new investors was not publicized. However, the financial press released information from distressed-debt traders asserting that a significant part of Eurotunnel's junior debt (£1.5 billion) has been sold to American funds specialising in bankrupt firms during the years 1996 (The Economist, May 22, 1997 above). In this view, the 1995-1998 financial restructuring was just the last step of the banks' passivity. However, the situation in the years 1996-1997, during which the decisive negotiations took place, was quite different from the one during the construction phase. The tunnel was completed and Eurotunnel's liquidation value was higher even if the assets were very specific.
Moreover, even if Eurotunnel won a 40% market share of the cross-channel market, the commercial exploitation of the tunnel was deceiving as actual operational profit and revenues were far lower than those projected. Consequently, Eurotunnel's continuation value was clearly less in 1996-1997 than before the completion of the construction. Are there any additional reasons explaining the reluctance of banks to seize the assets?
Theoretically, Diamond (2004) predicts that, when enforcement costs are high, lender passivity may be reduced by the use of short term contracts and by borrowing through a high number of lenders. For him, the high number of lenders acts as a commitment to going to court when the borrower defaults and enhances the ex ante incentives of the borrower. He quotes the results of Detragiache et al. (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000) who find that loan syndicates contain more lenders when enforcement costs are higher as consistent with his theory. Recently, Sufi (2005) explores empirically the syndicated loan market and finds two interesting features of syndicate structure: in order to increase monitoring, the lead arranger retains a larger portion of the loan when the borrowing firm is more opaque; when the borrower is more likely to renegotiate ex post the loan, lead arrangers add ex ante participants with very small portions of the loan in order to reduce strategic default. The Eurotunnel's case shares some of the features evoked by Diamond (2004) or Sufi (2005) . We already know that enforcement costs were high and that the size of the loan syndicate was very large (despite a decrease from the initial 220 lenders to 174 in May 1997). Examining more precisely the structure of Eurotunnel's bank syndicate, it appears that the 10 leading banks held 37.75% of Eurotunnel's junior debt in May 1997. At the same date, there were numerous banks holding a small portion of the junior debt (54 lenders had an individual claim of less than 0.1% of the junior debt and 83 less than 0.2%).
Following Diamond (2004) and Sufi (2005) , this type of syndicate structure should have made any restructuring quite impossible. The only departure from Diamond's theory comes from the long-term maturity of the debt. Clearly, this specific feature is not sufficient to explain lender passivity as lenders had the possibility to ask for liquidation once Eurotunnel defaulted on its obligations. 29 As a consequence, the most convincing explanation of lenders passivity comes here from the low benefits of liquidation compared to high enforcement costs due to political consequences and legal complexity. 30 The bankruptcy solution had also a major drawback for the banks that feared legal disputes under the French doctrine of "soutien abusif". This doctrine stipulates that the banks of a bankrupted firm can be held financially responsible if it can be proved that they had delayed the triggering of bankruptcy. Paradoxically, the more effective way for the banks to counter this threat was to avoid bankruptcy by rolling over their claims on
Eurotunnel. Overall, the Eurotunnel's case shows the limits of the ex ante mechanisms used to guarantee a tough behaviour of the banks should the firm defaults. 31 On an ex post point of view, lender passivity was here optimal even if one can ask himself about the adverse ex ante effect on other stakeholders' incentives (for example, on the behaviour of construction companies).
The last point concerns the behaviour of individual shareholders during the 1995-1998 financial restructuring. The banks' reluctance to seize the assets contrasts with the attitude of several associations of shareholders who lobbied for a formal bankruptcy. At first glance, this attitude was surprising as shareholders had nothing to gain from bankruptcy. However, it illustrates the importance of political concerns in the Eurotunnel's case where more than 700,000 individual shareholders were implicated. Through their action, individual shareholders tried to trigger a state-intervention either directly (through the nationalization of the Tunnel) or indirectly, through governmental pressures on the bank syndicate. In other words, some of the shareholders clearly tried to lobby for an APR violation either through political pressure or through the threat of legal pursuits against banks. 32 As stated by Georges Berlioz, an attorney of an association of shareholders: "The real reason they have not formally declared bankruptcy is (because) they know the banks face civil and criminal liabilities" (quoted in Winninghof 1996) . Even if this shareholders' pressure for bankruptcy didn't prevent the implementation of the restructuring plan, 30 The fact that political pressure dominated coordination problems is attested by many sources. Some traders, quoted in Bank Letter dated October 27, 1997, said about approval delays: "There are no holdouts…The process takes longer because there are so many international banks…When you get down to this few banks (the ones that take time to approve the restructuring plan), there's no way it [won't] go through. If you're holding up the international restructuring of Eurotunnel, the political pressure you'd get would definitely be on." 31 Alternatively, the dispersion of debt ownership may have strengthened the credibility of the banks' threat to liquidate if we consider the small concessions of the bank syndicate in the 1995-1998 restructuring. However, this interpretation along the lines of Sufi (2005) suffers from the fact that the number of lenders decreased from 220 to 174 between 1987 and 1997. one can imagine that this pressure obliged the lenders to make greater concessions than expected in 1995.
Conclusions
The Eurotunnel case illustrates how agency conflicts and an ill-defined contractual structure can explain the failure of large project companies. The case also demonstrates how lender passivity can naturally emerge when a firm's financial condition deteriorates and why banks can have incentives to maintain chronic financial distress while avoiding formal bankruptcy.
The failure of large project companies is a largely unresolved problem. The question is all the more interesting since the growing literature on project finance suggests that this type of loan has a superior ability to reduce agency problems and should result on high performance. Our findings on Eurotunnel are radically different. The project finance structure was at the origin of major agency conflicts that contributed to underperformance. At the very beginning of the project, the banks were unable to stem the opportunism of the other initial sponsor (the construction companies) due to their lack of expertise. When Eurotunnel's financial condition deteriorated, the banks who took the control transferred a part of their risk to individual shareholders. Generally, the Eurotunnel case illustrates the dangers of ill-defined long term contracts, the problems created by the transition from a private to a public ownership and the limits of bank-dominated companies.
Eurotunnel shed also some light on the problem of lender passivity. This passivity is surprising since Eurotunnel's debt structure was originally defined to prevent this type of problem. What was wrong? We argue that, despite the high number of participant banks in the loan syndicate, the banks have constantly tried to avoid bankruptcy. Following Diamond (2004) , they did not respect their ex ante commitment to going to court should the financial situation deteriorates.
Two main reasons are provided. First, Eurotunnel's liquidation value was very low as its assets were highly specific. Second, enforcement costs were very high due to the political and legal context. The high number of individual shareholders made bankruptcy difficult as the governments (and especially the French one) wished to avoid adverse political consequences and exerted an intense lobbying over banks. The banks had also incentives to favour continuation due to the threat of legal pursuits under the debtor-friendly French bankruptcy law.
If passive, the banks made limited concessions. Our valuation shows that the restructuring plan finalized in 1998 led to a wealth transfer from shareholders to the bank syndicate. Eurotunnel remained highly leveraged after the restructuring. Maintaining Eurotunnel in chronic financial distress was an optimal strategy for banks since they kept a high bargaining power in subsequent restructurings while avoiding a costly bankruptcy.
